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THE UNITY OF TRUTH.
fRUTH, thou art but one. Thou maj-est appear to
us now stern and now mild, yet thou remainest always
the same. Thou blessest him that loves thee, thou
revealest thy nature to those that seek thee, thou
hidest thy countenance from him that disregards thee,
and thou punishest him that hateth thee. But whether
it is life or death thou givest, whether thy dispensations
are curses or blessings, thou remainest always the same,
thou art never in contradiction with thyself ; thy curses
affirm thy blessings, and thy rewards show the justice
of th)' punishments. Thou art one from eternity to
eternity; and there is no second truth beside thee.
There was a strange superstition among the learned
of the middle ages. The Schoolmen believed in the
duality of truth. Something might be true, they main-
tained, in philosophy, which was not true in theology ;
a religious truth might be true so far as religion was con-
cerned, but it might be wrong in the province of sci-
ence, and vice versa a scientific truth might be an
error in the province of religion.
The Nation of August 7th, 1890, contains a criti-
cism by an able pen of the aim which is pursued by
The Open Court. But the criticism is written from
the standpoint that tTie duality of truth is a matter of
course ; whereas it is merely a modernised reminis-
cence of the scholastic doctrine that that which is true
in science will not be true in religion.
The criticism of The Nation, which was quoted
in full by Mr. Hegeler, in his article, "Science and
Religion," (No. 157), characterizes the effort to concil-
iate religion with science as a foredetermined conclu-
sion—a struggle that implies a defect of intellectual
integrity and tends to undermine the whole moral
health "Religion," it is maintained, " to be
true to itself should demand an unconditional surren-
der of freethinking."
It is true enough that many religious doctrines
stand in flat contradiction to certain propositions that
have been firmly established by science ; and the
churches that proclaim and teach these doctrines do
not even think of changing them. There are dogmas
that defy all rules of sound logic, and yet they are re-
tained ; they are cherished as if they were sacred
truth. But church doctrines and dogmas are not
rehgion ; church doctrines and dogmas are traditions.
They may contain many good things but they may
also contain errors, and it is our holy and religious
duty to examine them, to winnow them so as to
separate the good wheat from the useless chaff.
Let us obey the rule of the apostle, to hold fast
only that and all that which is good. And what is
good ? Let us enquire of Truth for an answer. That
is good which agrees with truth. Good is not that
which pleases your fancy, however lofty and noble
your imagination, and however better, grander, or
sweeter than the stern facts of reality you may deem
it to be. You will find that in the end all things that
appear good, but are not in accord with truth, are
elusive : they will be discovered to be bad ; usually
they are worse than those things which are bad and
appear so to us at first sight.
What is religion ? Religion is our inmost self ; it
is the sum total of all our knowledge applied to con-
duct. It is the highest ideal of our aspirations, in
obedience to which we undertake to build our lives.
Religion in one word is truth itself. Religion is dif-
ferent from science in so far as it is more than scien-
tific truth ; it is applied truth. Religion does not con-
sist of dogmas, nor does the Religion of Science consist
of scientific formulas. Scientific formulas, if not applied
to a moral purpose, are dead letters to religion, for
religion is not a formulation of truth, but it is living
the truth. True religion is, and all religion ought to
be what Christ said of himself and of his mission,
"the way, the truth, and the life."
If a teacher tells his pupil never to be satisfied with
his work until the result when examined agrees with
the requirements, and to work his examples over until
they come out right ; is that a predetermined conclu-
sion ? In a certain sense it is, but not in the sense
our critic proposes. If objection is made to a duality
of truth, and if it is maintained that religion and scien-
tific truth cannot contradict each other, is that an
effort which " implies a defect of intellectual integrity
and tends to undermine the whole moral health " ?
Just the contrary ; it is the sole basis of intellectual
integrity, it is the indispensable condition of all moral
health.
"Religion to be true to itself should demand,"
and that religion which The Open Court proposes,
does demand not "an unconditional surrender of free-
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thinking" or of free enquiry, but an unconditional de-
votion to truth. Does science demand free thinking?
Perhaps the answer may be "yes," and there can be
no objection provided that free-thinking means free
enquiry and the absence of all compulsion. But the
free-thinking that is demanded by science means at the
same time an absolute obedience to the laws of thought.
The same free-thinking, which is at the same time
an unconditional surrender to truth, is the cardinal
demand of religion. The great reformer Martin Luther
called it the freedom of conscience and considered it
as the most precious prerogative of a Christian.
The Open Court does not propose to conciliate
science with certain Christian or Mosaic or Buddhistic
doctrines. This would be absurd and such an under-
taking would justly deserve a severe criticism, for it
would be truly a predetermined conclusion in the
sense that our critic intends. It wpuld ' ' imply a defect
of intellectual integrity and undermine the moral
health." Autocracy and individualism are not recon-
cilable, but socialism and individualism are reconcil-
able. Order and liberty are not such deadly enemies
as may appear at first sight. Superstition and science
are irreconcilable, but religion and science are not
irreconcilable. Indeed, the history of religious progress
is a constant conciliation between science and religion.
Religion and science, it is maintained, must "seek
each a self-development in its own interest." Cer-
tainly it must, but this does not prevent that which
we deem to be religious truth being constantly ex-
amined before the tribunal of science, and that
which we deem to be scientific truth being con-
stantly referred to religion. Our critic seems to have
no objection to religion and science coming into accord,
but he proposes to wait until they approach comple-
tion. If this maxim were universally adopted, there
would be no progress in the development of religion.
Is not "completion " a very relative state? Waiting
for completion would be about equivalent to stopping
all social reform until mankind has reached the mil-
lennium. Every social reform is a step onward along
the path to the millennium, and every conciliation be-
tween science and religion is a step onward in the
revelation of living truth.
The religion of the middle ages was a religion of
dualism, it proposed the duality of truth. The religion
of the future will be a religion of Monism ; and what
means Monism ? Monism means unity of truth. Truth
is invincible. It never contradicts itself, for there is
but one truth and that one truth is eternal.
A SHEEPISH TAX.
BY F. M. HOLLAND.
There is a good deal of romance about the shep-
herd with his pipe and crook. Our American shep-
herd's crook, however, throws too heavy a burden of
taxation upon our people ; and we pay him exorbi-
tantly for piping the tune to which we all have to dance.
How badly the poor are fleeced to enrich the wool-
grower, was shown in my previous article ;* and I
now wish to show how the tax for his benefit is actu-
ally collected, and also what effect it has upon the
prosperity of manufactures and on rates of wages in
factories.
This duty, in the case of merino and other fine
wool, such as is used for clothing, is ten cents a
pound for grades not worth more than thirty cents a
pound ; for more costly grades the rate is twelve cents ;
and the average increase of price in consequence is fifty
per cent. Coarse wool, used for carpets, is taxed two
and a half or five cents a pound, according to value
;
and in this case the duty amounts on the average to
about twenty-five per cent. The result is higher
prices of American as well as foreign wool, and also
of all woolen goods, wherever manufactured. This is
precisely the way in which the duty was meant to act
;
and if it did not work so, it would be abolished at
once. The duty on wool was intended for the benefit
of the grower ; and the only way it can help him is by
keeping up the price of his fleece. His gain is his
neighbor's loss. Even protectionists admit that "pro-
tection raises prices "; and they would not want it if it
did not.
It is estimated that one-half of all the wool used
in America is imported, partly in the form of woolen
cloth. In taxing the half which is imported, govern-
ment raises the price of the half which is grown here
also, and of all the woolen goods sold in America.
Every dollar thus raised by the government costs the
people two dollars, one of which goes as extra profit
to the wool grower, who could not be protected other-
wise. This makes the tax on wool twice as oppres-
sive as if it were laid on articles not produced in this
country, like rough diamonds. They come in free of
duty ; but every dollar taken from our people by tax-
ing them would go straight to the government.
It must also be noticed that this tax on wool is not
intended to protect the manufacturer in the least; and
its actual effect is to make him pay twenty-five or fifty
per cent, more for his wool than his rivals do abroad.
Every other nation which has factories lets them have
wool and other raw materials free of duty.
Our National Association of Wool Manufacturers
complained, some years ago, that they were thus put
under "disadvantages from which our foreign com-
petitors are wholly exempt ;" and the Wool Consum-
ers' Association, largely made-up of owners of facto-
ries in New England, has asked in vain of Congress,
"that American industry may be relieved of this un-
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natural burden." The circular of this Association de-
clares that, "The foreign manufacturer alone has pro-
fited by the duty on wool," while the American has
been "constantly and heavily handicapped. " Recent
reports from our woolen mills are by no means rose-
colored ; and our import of European cloth was almost
twice as large in 1888 as in 1880.
It is true that our manufacturer is given some com-
pensation, for the dearness of his woo!, and that for this
purpose there is a duty on all woolen goods of thirty-five
cents per pound, or forty in case the price per pound
exceeds eighty cents. This duty according to weight
presses most severely upon buyers of cheap goods, as
has been shown already; and it must be remembered
that its object is simply to repay the manufacturers
for what he loses by the tax on wool. If it were not
for this loss, he would need no other protection than
what is given him by a tax, imposed according to
value, and amounting to thirty-five per cent. This
latter tax has always been in force, though its rate has
varied ; and there is very little controversy about it.
The main difference of opinion is about the propriety
of taxing wool, and repaying the manufacturer by the
duty imposed on cloth according to its weight. He is
supposed to gain much more than he loses by this ar-
rangement, except in the size of his market. He can-
not send woolen goods abroad without being under-
sold hopelessly by foreigners who get their wool at
two-thirds of the price which he is obliged to pay.
They pay lower wages, also ; but he gets more efficient
operatives, so that he pays no more money than they
do for the same amount and quality of work. This
substantial equality in cost of labor has been expressly
admitted by Secretary Blaine, and proved by actual
comparison of the books kept in English and Ameri-
can factories. The only advantage which the for-
eigner has is in the cheapness of wool and other raw
materials; and this is enough to close every foreign
market against American goods. Many of our lead-
ing manufacturers declare that they had rather make
large sales at moderate profits than small sales at high
rates ; and there can be no question which would be
better for our people generally.
The interest of the operative is to have the demand
for labor increased, or in other words to have our
factories run to their full capacity^ and their number
increase rapidly. Plent}' of work means plenty of
pay. The only way to increase the demand for labor
is to increase the demand for goods, by throwing new
markets open. The manufacture and exportation of
shoes and other leather goods have greatly increased
among us, since hides were put on the free list ; and
the recent attempt to restore this duty was defeated
by the general protest of business men of all parties.
Our shoe-shops need free hides in order to have wages
kept up
; and there is just the same need of free wool
in our woolen mills. The two cases are precisely sim-
ilar ; and the decision of our legislators not to restore
the duty on hides is an admission of a principle which
forbids taxing wool or other raw materials. Mr. Pow-
derly and other friends of the laborer insist that raw
m.aterials ought to come in free, in order to make
manufacturing prosper and wages remain high. It is
restriction to a single market that has made over pro-
duction easy, factory business slack, and wages much
too low, considering what high prices our operatives
have to pay for the necessaries of life. They get no
compensation for having the tariff double the average
prices of their shawls, woolen cloth, stockings, etc.
;
and all their burdens will be increased by the McKin-
ley bill.
The duty on wool is often said to benefit no one
but the wool grower ; and there is much reason to
doubt if it is of any real benefit to him. The national
librarian says that the average price of wool was more
than twenty per cent, higher, during twenty years in
which there was little or no duty, than since the pres-
ent tax was imposed in 1867. In that year there were
more than twice as many sheep as at present west of
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers ; and the loss in
Illinois is nearly three-fourths. It looks as if our
American Boo-Peeps would soon find they had lost
all their sheep, except in the far West. There sheep
are still so profitable, that many who raise them would
gladly have all duties on foreign wool abolished. They
know that Idaho wool will always be needed in our
factories, however low may be the price of Australian
and South American wool ; and that the greater the
importation of foreign wool the greater will be the de-
mand for American wool to mix with it. So the Wool
Consumers' Association declares that "The duties on
wool ought to be removed or greatly reduced for the
benefit of our domestic wool growers and woolen man-
ufacturers alike."
In short, the duty on wool seems to benefit no one,
not even the grower; and it is certainly a heavy bur-
den on all consumers, especially operatives in facto-
ries. If those who have kept it up for twenty-three
years knew what they had done, they would say, "All
we, like sheep, have gone astray, and there is no sense
in it."
A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT.
BY MADAME E. FLEURY ROBINSON.
[concluded.]
When my parents decided to join the communistic
colony at Nauvoo, we had to leave the mother coun-
try with no hope of returning. A list was sent to the
families that purposed joining the community, of the
articles of clothing to be allowed to each one. For
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example, jewelry and bric-a-brac, were to be sold or
given away, and often when these were gifts or sou-
venirs it was particularly painful. Almost everything
else had to be sold, for it was desired that all should
contribute as much as possible, over and above their
admission fee. The members were also to take the
name of "citoyen" and "citoyenne," the term Mon-
sieur and Madame savouring too much of the old
regime.
In our case everything being ready, a sad adieu
was said to friends and relatives, and the diligence,
(in those days there were no railroads,) carried us away
to Paris, where our money and valuables were to be
left at the community's office in the Rue St. Honore.
We heard here we were to meet a party of Icarians at
Havre, from which place we embarked with them one
afternoon in a slow sailing vessel, which was to be
our home for fifty-six days. The party was thor-
oughly animated with the principles of equality and
brotherhood ; they were ready to help one another
without any hope of being rewarded for so doing, and
many were the opportunities presented to test their
loyalty to those principles.
Arriving at New Orleans a few days were spent
there waiting for the steamboat which was to carry us
to our home at Nauvoo. St. Louis was passed on the
way, where a few seceding members, still concerned
in all that related to the community, tried to discour-
age and detain the new arrivals by representations
partly false and partly true of their experiment. They
were successful in some cases where the argument
used, touched some weakness or failing in the individ-
ual. To those fond of dress they represented the sim-
ple and even coarse clothing worn by the members
;
to the fond mother the separation from her children
;
to the industrious they told of the labor by which the
lazy profited as well as themselves, and only the most
devoted to the cause reached the community without
some abatement of their enthusiasm. This seceder's
station at St. Louis did much to sow discontent
among the new comers, and afforded an easy retreat
for those who afterwards became dissatisfied.
We had left France at the end of February, and
reached Nauvoo in May. The landing place was a
stone buildmg which had been erected by the Mor-
mons as a warehouse and station for steamboats. Sev-
eral Icarians were there to meet us and we were taken
to the town. Rooms had been made ready and every-
thing provided for our comfort.
After a few days of rest, during which all the news
from France was eagerly devoured, the new comers
were assigned to their places. The children were
taken to school, and the -tears flowed freely when
mother and children, brothers and sisters were sepa-
rated. The community itself was very much like a
school for adults. A large square, in which the Mor-
mons had built their temple, had been chosen as the
centre of the Icarian colony. Several houses had been
rented for the accommodation of the families, but a
large building had been erected for a refectory,
kitchen, hall for meetings, and where, on Sundays, the
members met for readings or amusements. A theatre
by Icarian artists, and music by their own orchestra
of forty pieces, was enjoyed by all, even by the Amer-
icans, who became quite anxious for invitations to the
Sunday entertainments.
Forbearance, humility, charity, and other great
lessons were to be learned, and some old ways and
bad habits had to be abandoned. Selections were
often read to impress these lessons and arouse the so-
cialistic enthusiasm.
For a period of seven years Icaria prospered, and
with but few exceptions, all the members were con-
tented if not happy. There was certainly a shadow
in this picture, but it arose from the financial straits,
which materially contributed to the ultimate downfall
of the community. Finding that they were unable to
pay the rents of their lands, three thousand acres were
purchased in Iowa. A few were sent to prepare for
the future transfer of the whole colony. Later, dis-
sensions arose. Some, claiming that M. Cabet's fac-
ulties were declining, formed a conspiracy against his
authority. This resulted in a division, and one hun-
dred and eighty members followed M. Cabet to St.
Louis where they had resolved to retire.
M. Cabet was now sixty-nine years old. This
separation affected him more than all he had dared
and suffered in his long career. One week after their
arrival in St. Louis, he died of apoplexy, or rather of
a broken heart.
His followers tried for some time to organize a new
community. With the same principles and fresh
courage, they thought to realize the ideal even more
perfectly than the first attempt had done. Prosper-
ous for awhile they finally split on the question as to
who should be the successor of M. Cabet, who had
been elected director for ten years. There were those
who wished to elect a director for life. Division w s
the result, and the minority retired. Financial em-
barrassment finally compelled the few persevering
ones to discontinue their community.
The community at Nauvoo suffered much materi-
ally and morally from the separation. Reduced in
numbers with diminished means, they resolved to re-
move to Iowa. Here new trials and difficulties awaited
them. Their land lay in Adams County, near the Mis-
souri River. M. Cabet, at the time the site was se-
lected thought it best that the community should live
in great seclusion, but it was unnecessary tp choose
such a remote tract of land. The markets were very
THE OREN COURT. 2505
distant at that time, and if the Icariansliad had a' sur-
plus crop, they could not have sold it. The cost of
removal, and the difficulty in obtaining materials was
a further drain upon their resources.
The story of the privations suffered in those pioneer
days in Iowa is a very sad one. Those leaving Nau-
voo to join the colony in Adams County, where there
were no railroads, were many days on the way. At
last reaching the settlement they found a few log
houses without floors, doors or windows, which in sum-
mer did very well, but were practicall}' useless when
winter approached. Men and teams had to be sent a
hundred miles to St. Joseph, Mo., which was then the
nearest and largest city, for supplies. These trips
were made several times during the year, the colonists
taking with them bacon and corn, the only products
as yet to exchange for glass, hardware, dry goods, and
groceries. But few groceries were purchased, as only
the sick and feeble could have sugar, coffee, and wheat
bread. The able-bodied drank coffee made of roasted
rye, without sugar, and ate corn bread and bacon.
The menu for meals was soon arranged. For break-
fast rye coffee, corn bread and butter; dinner, corn
bread and bacon ; supper, mush and milk.
The few goods purchased were unbleached cotton
and dark blue gingham or calico for the women ; some
kind of twilled woolen goods for the men.
When, in i860, the civil war broke out, provisions
of all kinds became so expensive that the greatest
economy was necessary, calico being fifty cents a yard,
all else in proportion. When I remember how cheer-
ful we were, with so little to make us happy, I realize
how true it is, that we are to a great degree creatures
of circumstances.
When the men returned with their purchases they
were looked upon as heroes who had accomplished
some great deed, for the men spoke little English, and
it was as if they had been away to a foreign country.
Slowly the houses were finished and each family
made its home as comfortable and pretty as possible.
The next year the crop of wheat afforded flour for
wheat bread ; cattle and sheep furnished meat ; vege-
tables were plentiful, and although there were no lux-
uries, there was an abundance of the necessaries of
life.
The men started to their various labors in the
morning, and the women, after arranging their homes,
would go to the common room, some good reader be-
ing chosen to entertain the citoyennes while the}'
sewed or mended. Others went out to the laundry or
to help in the kitchen. These last occupations were
taken in turn, so that pleasant and unpleasant work
was done by all. The cooking had always been done
by men. At the time of which I speak, we had the
good fortune to have a chef de cuisine, who has
since become wealthy as a restaurateur in St. Louis,
not in a better cause, but with better materials for his
business.
Assemblies were held every Saturday evening
where propositions for furthering the welfare of the
community were discussed and voted upon. Women
did not vote, but were free to offer their opinions. Of-
ficers elected by vote executed the decisions of the as-
semblies.
Each member employed Sunday as he wished, and
in the evening, music, the theatre, or dancing, af-
forded amusement for all.
Although it began in poverty, the community now
possessed 2,000 acres of land, 600 sheep, 140 head of
cattle, and 40 horses. Everything was plain but sub-
stantial, and the majority were contented. Still, the
members did not always agree, and from time to time
many became dissatisfied and withdrew. My own
family withdrew from the colony in 1863, taking next to
nothing with them.
In 1876, two parties, one composed mainly of the
older members, averse to changes ; the other wishing
to make improvements in the practical life of the com-
munit}', became quite antagonistic and finally pro-
posed terms of separation.
There was no lack of zeal on either side for their
social ideal, the difference was over a question of com-
munity policy. The party tvhich demanded separa-
tion asked a division of land and stock. Each man,
woman, and child to be given ten acres of land ; each
branch to carry on their affairs separately, and to ad-
mit such members as the)' might think suitable. This
proposition was rejected and the struggle between the
progressive and the conservative party made ene-
mies in the same household and sundered many ties.
Recourse to the courts was the result.
In 1878, the court declared the charter of the col-
ony forfeited, and appointed trustees to wind up the
business of the community. Later, American arbi-
trators were chosen to replace the trustees, who ap-
portioned the property among the members of each
party as best they could, and the colony divided into
an Eastern and Western settlement. The old party
was to remain in the original village, but by agree-
ment, they consented to become the emigrants, taking
the name of the New Icarian Community. The young
party settled in the village and kept the ancient name,
namel}' the Icarian Community, and both with com-
mendable courage and patience took up the broken
threads of community life.
On the ist of January, 1883, the property of New
Icaria, composed of the old members, was worth
§25,000, with but $4,000 indebtedness. Its member-
ship amounted to 34. The acquisition of wealth not
being their main object they tried to make their toil
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as light as possible. They established at that time and
still publish a little paper, to apprise their friends
in the United States and in France of their doings.
Their life would seem monotonous to many, yet, I
believe, it is a more rational life than that which is led
by most American farmers. In this age of discontent
the Icarians lead a serene and quiet life.
The other, 5'ounger party consisted in 1883 of
thirty-five members, mostly women and children. A
document was drawn up by which any one who should
leave the community in the future, agreed to relin-
quish all claim upon the community's property. They
admitted new members, and soon their membership
increased to seventy. All labored with energy; they
adopted advanced methods of agriculture. Many ap-
plicants wished to be admitted, and young Icaria en-
joyed an enviable reputation. This good fortune was
not to be continued. No bitter crisis or quarrel arose,
only differences of opinion as to matters of policy.
Some retired to private life; one or two families
went ,to Florida, with the purpose of founding an Ica-
rian colony there, and one group went to California
to inaugurate still another enterprise.
So many members leaving, it was found impossi-
ble to keep up all their industries, and the cultivation
of land on a large scale was given up. They found
that the arduous business of general farming was an
impediment to their motal and intellectual progress,
and they began to think of moving to a milder climate
where horticulture, an employment more suitable to
the Gallic temperament, would take the place of gen-
eral farming.
Florida, Texas, Tennesee were talked of. Finally
negotiations were entered upon between the group
that had gone to California and those left in Iowa,
and an agreement was made to unite as soon as the
property in Iowa could be disposed of.
The California community is called Icaria-Sper-
anza. Surely the prospect is attractive. It looks as
if a better opportunity was now offered for testing
their Icarian principles. The six months' of leisure
afforded by the climate in the beautiful land of Cali-
fornia will give them the time needed for mental im-
provement.
Composed of an intelligent and industrious class
of mechanics and of many remarkable men, why did
Icaria fail?
The first cause was certainly the want of funds to
carry on such an enterprise in a foreign land. Had
the community, like that in M. Cabet's "Voyage en
Icaria," been isolated ; had it not needed intercourse
with the outside world, and could it have lived as
people do in romances on principle and sentiment,
Icaria would, no doubt, have kept all its adherents.
As it was, new customs and manners of transacting
business had to be learned ; the language was new to
all but a few, who understood it incorrectly.
The American people, although republicans, were
antagonistic to ideas of communism and democracy,
as understood by the French republicans. It was said
by those of the first advance guard, that while in
Texas and Louisiana, their name of democrats made
friends for them everywhere, but that after their re-
moval to Illinois and Iowa, this name caused them to
be looked upon with suspicion and made their neigh-
bors more averse to them.
On account of their financial needs, many were
taken into the community who had means, but whose
principles were far from those required to insure suc-
cess to a community where peace and unity were the
first obligations. Later, the older members failed to
discern that the best interests of the community re-
quired innovations.
It was evident also that by intermarriage with the
Americans, an element was introduced which tended
to undermine the unselfish communistic ideas which
lay at the foundation of Icaria ; for I have no doubt
that the proposition to divide the property of the com-
munity originated with the American element. It was
next to impossible that the children of the Icarians
themselves brought up in communistic principles and
whose parents in many cases had grown old in the ser-
vice of the community, should wish to undo the work
accomplished with so much labor and heroic self-sac-
rifice. The experiment of Icaria certainly developed
the intellect of all its members, and proved that a so-
ciet)' can exist without pauperism, intemperance, or
crime.
Many of the adherents to this cause developed a
character, and a high purpose in life, such as few men
under other circumstances attain to.
It proved that selfishness and competition are not
a necessary foundation of society as many affirm, and
as for myself I am ready to say that the years during
which I knew no mine and thine, were with all the
privations, the happiest in my life.
The actual results of practical Communism thus far,
have illustrated very imperfectly the advantages which
belong to this mode of living. But as men advance
to higher stages of culture, this way of living will be
more possible, and I believe will more and more be
tried, and more and more succeed.
FEELING AS A PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESS.
In a former article of ours entitled "Feeling and
Motion," the question was proposed : "What is the
molecular combination that is accompanied with feel-
ing, and what is its mode of action ? "
This question is not as yet answered by phj'siolog}'.
It is a problem still, and we are far from a solution
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that would be satisfactory in all its details. We know
something about the subject, but that something is
very little in comparison to what our physiologists
would like to know.
The ganglions are for good reasons supposed to
be the seat of feeling
;
yet it must not be understood
that feeling is created there alone. It is there alone
that feeling is centralized. It appears that the sen-
sory organs with their natural covering, the skin, also
belong to the whole feeling apparatus. Every one
of them is an indispensable part for the production of
normal feelings. If anyone of these parts is injured,
feeling will either cease altogether or at least be dis-
turbed. If, for instance, the tactile bodies (the Pa-
cinian corpuscles) are not covered with skin, irrita-
tions will no longer be felt as tactile impressions, but
as pain.
The process of a nervous transmission is extremely
complicated, and our observation is limited to its
crudest outlines only. We know, however, that the
transmission through the ganglions must be even more
complicated than the transmission through the fibres,
for according to minute measurements b}' Helmholtz,
a nervous shock travels through the human nerve
fibre at an average rate of 30-40 metres in a sec-
ond, but it is much retarded on its passage through
the ganglions.
*
Du Bois Reymond has proved that every trans-
mission of nervous irritations is accompanied with
electrical phenomena. The apparatus connected with
the nerve for measuring the electric tension shows a
decrease of the strength of the current during a state
of nervous activity. This was called by Du Bois Rey-
mond negative ScJnvankung, "negative fluctuation."
The negative fluctuation of the electric tension, it
may be incidentally mentioned, is not at all a phe-
nomenon of nervous activity alone. Du Bois Rey-
mond's law holds good for muscular fibres also. In
a state of rest, the living muscle, like the nerve, shows
in the galvanometer the presence of a low and con-
stant current, which in a state of activitj^ noticeably
decreases, proving that that much electricity is being
used in other directions.
The nervous system is often, and not without good
and obvious reasons, represented as a telegraphic ap-
paratus. The method of transmission also has re-
peatedly been compared to our modern system of
telegraphing through electric currents. The won-
derful achievements which man accomplished with
the help of electricity, seemed to suggest that ner-
vous transmission might be of an electrical nature.
Since the discover)', however, made by Du Bois Rey-
mond, we knotu for certain that this is an error. Ner-
vous transmissions are accompanied by electrical phe-
nomena, yet they cannot be explained as such. This
is evident even from the different rate of transmission
;
electricity travels, according to Wheatstone, 464,000,
000 metres in one second, while the velocity of ner-
vous irritations, in spite of all the fabulous swiftness
of thought, is more than ten million times slower ; and if
nerve-activity is to be regarded as electrical action, how
can it differ from muscular activity which exhibits the
very same electrical phenomena ? Neither can the
nerve-fibres be compared to the wires of a telegraph,
which are transmitters simply of the electric current
;
for every single nerve-cell in a nervous fibre, and also
every cell in the muscular fibre, is in itself a small
electric batter}'. The whole process of nervous trans-
mission may rather be compared to a number of
small explosions transmitted over a line of grains of
powder. An irritation, i. e., an impression received
by some contact with the outer world in a sensory
organ, being transmitted through the sensory fibre to
the ganglion, and from the ganglion through the
motor fibre to a muscle, causes along the whole tract
of its transmission a continuous discharge of potential
energy stored up in the nervous substance. The
transmission being accompanied with many other
phenomena, ends in an innervation of the muscle which
forms the terminus of the motor nerve. This inner-
vation is the nervous discharge that causes the muscle
to contract and thus produces mechanical motion.
Let us for the sake of illustration represent the
nerves as a series of compressed springs, so arranged
that if one is released it will at the same time release
the next following ; thus any disturbance will travel
from one to the other along the whole series. The
organism is constantly at work to repair the losses in-
curred. As soon as potential energy is set free, new
structures are built by the circulating fluids freighted
with vitalized substances. Thus by the activity of
the blood, to return again to our simile, the dis-
charged springs of the nervous system are again and
again compressed, and thus they are, unless the ex-
haustion be carried too far, always ready for action.
If a shock is transmitted, the effects produced de-
pend first upon the shock itself. The more violent a
shock is the more sudden will the disturbance be.
And if a shock covers "a larger field of the skin, it
must necessarily irritate a larger number of nerve-
fibres, thus producing a greater excitement than if
two or three nerve-fibres were disturbed only. Yet the
main determining factor of the effect, it appears, is
the specific energy (as Johannes Miiller called it) of
the nervous substance in the nerve as well as in the
ganglion. Similarly, if a shock is transmitted through
a series of springs, the effect will depend upon the
springs chiefly—upon their form and their tension ;
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form and tension are the " specific energy "of the
springs. The different nerves became adapted to
special irritations. The optic nerve became adapted
to the ether waves ; their irritations are transferred to
the optic ganglions, and there possibly the disturbance
is accompanied with a feeling called light. The auditory
nerve became adapted to air waves ; this irritation
is transmitted to the auditory ganglion, and there
possibly it is accompanied with a feeling called sound
;
etc. By a constant and exclusive use for their special-
ized purposes through many thousands of genera-
tions, the tissues became so adapted to their special
work, that now they cannot otherwise react against
any kind of irritation than as sensations, the one of
light and the other of sound. Any disturbance, a ray
of light as well as an electric current, or a mechanical
concussion, will produce sensations of light on the
optic nerve, and sensations of sound in the auditory
nerve. The same causes will produce sensations of
smell in the olfactory nerve, and sensations of touch
or of temperature in the sensory nerves that terminate
in the skin.*
The feeling which originates in the ganglion, dur-
ing the transmission of a nervous perturbation, can
depend upon the forms only of the different cells. A
certain shock is received which sets free a series of
tensions ; the liberation of some of these tensions in
the ganglion is a commotion of sensory cells, accom-
panied by feeling. It is called a sensation. The
course of motions nowhere ceases to consist of mo-
tions. We have a continuous transference of motions,
yet some of these motions are accompanied with feel-
ing. These feelings are different among themselves,
and we have sufficient evidence to believe that their
difference exactly corresponds to the different forms
of nervous action which they accompany. We may,
accordingly, without impropriety, speak in this sense
of the different forms of feelings.
Suppose we had before us a line of cards arranged
in pairs leaning one against the other, in such a
manner that a slight shock will upset the whole
series
; a simile often employed to explain the trans-
ference of nervous shocks. At a certain point, in
about the middle of the line, let us suppose that a
bell is fixed, the tongue of which strikes the bell upon
the overthrow of the two adjoining cards. At the
end of the line, upon the two last pairs of cards,
stands a small vessel filled with water. Upon the over-
throw of the cards the water is spilt. The striking of
the bell represents sensation, f the spilling of the water
* Compare E. Hering, "The Specific Energies oft e Nervous System,"
Nos. 22 and 23 of The Open CouH.
+ The simile is in so far inadequate as the striking of the bell and the
air vibrations of sound are motions also. Feeling, howe>/er, is no motion,
and does not originate from a transformation of either potential or kinetic
energy.
muscle-innervation. The striking of the bell is not
changed into a spilling of water : the former only pre-
cedes the latter in time. If a nerve is irritated below
the ganglion, a muscle-innervation takes place with-
out sensation, with the same necessity as the water is
spilt without any previous sounding of the bell, when
the cards below the bell only have been upset. But
when the motor nerve is cut, and the sensory nerve
is irritated alone, then sensation only occurs, without
any reflex muscular motion, just as a perturbation of
the upper line of cards will make the bell sound, but if
the line below the bell is interrupted, it will not cause
the spilling of the water.
The mechanical connection of causes and effects
need not be interrupted, if that part of the transmit-
tance of nervous irritations which takes place in the
ganglion is so disturbed as to produce no actual feeling.
Suppose the bell be covered with a woolen cloth,
will not then the phenomenon of sound that accom-
panies the process cease altogether, although other-
wise there is nothing changed in the mechanism of the
transmission ? And when, through alcoholic poison-
ing, through medical drugs (anaesthetics), or through
any nervous disturbance, consciousness is for a time
obliterated, may not a man under certain circum-
stances act exactly as if he were in full possession of
consciousness? Does not often an intoxicated man
or a hypnotized subject move about and talk like other
people, and yet he knows nothing and afterwards he
will remember nothing of all that happened ?
The concatenation of circumstances is such that
we are easily mislead to suppose that when the cards
are overthrown the striking of the bell causes the spill-
ing of the water, and that consciousness sets the
muscles in motion. On this supposition only, which
takes a post hoc as a propter hoc, i. e., a mere se-
quence as a causal connection, is based the assump-
tion that consciousness is the motor power, the///-
)num movens, of the soul ; the cause, the principium,
and beginning of man's muscular movements, the ori-
gin and source of his activity. However, conscious-
ness does not produce the activity of our body. Con-
sciousness, as M. Ribot says, does not constitute the
situation ; on the contrary, it is constituted by the situ-
ation. Consciousness is an indicator only of a certain
Some psychologists compare the phenomenon of feeling to the sliadow
which accompanies the motions of a body. But a shadow is tlie absence
of light and light again is a mode of mot'on. Feeling is no motion, nor is it the
disappearance of motions. Other psycliologists have compared conscious-
ness to the sparks that an engine emits with the smoke. Sparks also, being
little particles of fire, are modes of motion. Thus these similes are also
inadequate.
It will be difficult, if at all possibly, to find an appropriate simile, and
why? Because, whatever allegory we take from the processes of the objec-
tive world, we constantly remain in the province of objectivity. Whatever un-
speakable difference there may be between two processes of objective phenom-
ena, they belong to the same domain ; while the domain of subjective reality
or feeling, in spite of the parallelism between both, is so heterogeneous that it
suffers no comparison.
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condition of our nerve-activity. It is not the cause of
a man's will, but it is the expression of a certain state
of mind, which, under normal conditions, will be fol-
lowed by an act of will, be it a real muscular motion,
a spoken word, which of course is muscular motion
also, or the inhibition of a motion.
Every idea considered not as a mere feeling but as
a brain-structure fit to serve as an irritation to ac-
tion (we call such ideas impulses), will, if not in-
hibited, pass into an act, whether it be connected with
consciousness or not. Consciousness itself is not the
motion that causes the transmission of nervous irrita-
tions, it is not the agency that discharges the inner-
vation for contracting the muscles. It is a phenome-
non that merely accompanies the physiological pro-
cess of a nervous transmission through the ganglion.
It is not the shadow that makes our body move
;
it is the body that moves ; and the shadow accom-
panies the movement. It is not the ticking of the
pendulum that sets the wheels of the clock in mo-
tion, but the swinging. The motion of the clock is
produced by the pressure of the weight which is trans-
ferred to the pendulum in the form of vibrations.
The motion of our limbs is caused through the trans-
mission of a nervous perturbation, setting free a
part of the potential energy stored up in our motor
nerves and in our muscles ; but there is, properl}'
speaking, no change of "consciousness" into "will,"
no change of "feeling" into "motion."
When we compare consciousness to the ticking of
a pendulum, we do not wish to maintain that con-
sciousness is as superfluous and indifferent as the tick-
ing of a pendulum. We merely express in this simile
that it is destitute of motor power. Although con-
sciousness is destitute of motor power, it is neverthe-
less of paramount importance. There is nothing re-
dundant in nature ; how can consciousness be a su-
perfluous factor in the constitution of man's mind ?
Consciousness may be compared to a light. It af-
fords in novel and difficult situations the possibility of
circumspection. The light in a machine room will en-
able the attendant engineer properly to regulate the
motions of the engine ; but the rays of the lantern
have no locomotive power upon the wheels and piston,
so as to set the engine into action. If the engineer
is a novice, he cannot do his work without light, but
the expert knows how to direct the lever even in the
dark. The consciousness of mental states is an indis-
pensable condition of the proper direction of will, but
it does not possess motor power.
*
* *
There appeared some time ago in The Open Court
an interesting discussion, conducted on both sides
with great ability, between Professor E. D. Cope
and Dr. Montgomery on the subject "Can Mind
move Matter?" Professor Cope answered the ques-
tion in the affirmative, and Dr. Montgomery in the
negative. But it appears that both used the word
mind as a synonym of consciousness. We should an-
swer the question "Can Consciousness move Matter ?"
with Dr. Montgomery in the negative, for conscious-
ness possesses no motor power. Yet the question
"Does consciousness enable the mind to control cer-
tain motions of matter?" (so Prof. Cope understood
the question) we should answer with Professor Cope
in the affirmative.
We understand by mind, as the term is generally
used, not consciousness alone, but the whole mental-
ity of man. It is a synonym of soul, and as such we
understand by mind a special form of an organism, the
activit}' of which is accompanied with states of con-
sciousness. The expression "soul" appears prefer-
able, if we think of emotions chiefly, while "mind"
has a special reference to the intellectual qualities. If
"mind" is used to mean man's thinking organ, not as
mere form pure and simple, nor as mere feeling, as mere
consciousness, which as a matter of course exists as an
abstract conception only, but as real brain structure,
in the sense of living nerve substance of a special form,
freighted with potential energy, and representing a
special combination of ideas ; there can be in that case
no doubt about it that mind does move matter. Mens
agitat inolem ! says the Roman poet,* and it is a very
old truth. The faculty of moving matter is indeed the
main thing that gives value to the mind of man, for it
is his mind that enables man to control the world
about him. p. c.
THE SUPERSCIENTIFIC AND PURE REASON.
Fundamental Pyoblenis, we find, has been a surprise to a re-
He says :
ed from Chicago's
viewer of TJie Natio
" A book of newspaper articles on metaphysics,
weekly journal of philosophy. The Open Court, seems to a New Yorker some-
thi g singular. But. granted that there is a public with aspirations to un-
derstand Fundamental Problems, the way in which Dr. Carus treats them is
not without skill. The questions touched upon are all those which a young
person should have turned over in his mind before beginni-g the serious
study of philosophy. The views adopted are, as nearly as possible, the average
opinions of thoughtful men to-day—good ripe doctrines, some of them pos-
sibly a little /asi^ci, but of the fashionable complexion. They are stated with
uncompromising vigor ; the argumentation does not transcend the capacity of
him who runs
"On the whole, The Open Court is marked by sound and enlightened ideas,
and the fact that it can by any means 6nd support does honor to Chicago."
Although the reviewer speaks so kincJly of Fundamental Prob-
lems, he has also faults to find. He discovers some inconsis-
tencies :
"If there be here and there an inconsistency, it only renders the book
more suggestive, and adapts it all the belter to the needs of the public."
It is not the kind praise allotted to the book which prompts me
to take notice of this review, it is the inconsistencies with which
it is charged. Some of them have reference to the most ' funda-
mental problems.' Upon the solution of these problems the treat-
ment of many less important problems depends. The critical
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parts of the review appear to me of sufficient importance to be
discussed in detail.
THE SUPERSCIENTIFIC AND THE CONDITIONS OF SCIENCE.
The reviewer says of the book :
" The theory it advocates is superscientific."
Here I must protest against the word "superscientific." It is
none of my invention. All the combinations with "super" or
" hyper," it appears to me, are very useful words if employed in
the domain of ethics. Morality is the constant struggle to higher
planes ; the moral man is always engaged in improving himself as
well as the conditions of human existence. Accordingly ethics
must teach us to look above, it points stirsttm. It attempts to
raise man to a higher and nobler existence ; it instructs him how
to transcend the present state and shows to the individual a realm
of superindividual interests, in accordance with which the indi-
vidusl must regulate his actions. Whatever be the merit of the
combinations with "super" and "hyper" in the domain of ethics,
they are in the domain of philosophy dangerous words ; for they
are full of vagueness and should be regarded with suspicion.
Judging from the context, it is most probable that our reviewer
limits the term "scientific " to " empirical". Botany, in that case,
would be a science, but logic would not. Botany is a natural sci-
ence, it rests upon empirical knowledge ; logic is a theory of for-
mal thought, it is not properly scientific, for it is not empirical ;
yet it is superscientific. The superscientific is applicable to all
sciences, and it is the condition of all sciences. The reviewer con-
tinues :
" ' There is no chaos, and never has been a chaos,' exclaims the author,
although o£ this no scientific evidence is possible. The doctrine of ' the rigid-
ity of natural laws , ... is a K-7///a ff ah: Yet, emphatic as this is, we
soon find the KTr/fia ig ah is nothing but a regulative principle, or 'plan for a
sy tern.' "
The phrase, " emphatic as this is," contains a tinge of disap-
proval, as though the statement were made boldly. If there is any
boHness in the statement of the rigidity of law, our critic must
not blame the philosopher alone, but also science. Science has in
these last centuries (nay, it has always ever since science was sci-
ence) taken its stand upon the rigidity of law. Upon the rigidity
of law depends the uniformity of nature, and without the uni-
formity of nature science would be impossible. The philosopher
may either recognize science or he may not. If he does not, he
den es the possibility of knowledge and his philosophy dissolves
into scepticism. The sceptic declares that we can have no science,
we can never know for certain ; we can never be sure of anything,
not evi n that 2x2=4 ; we can have opinions only. Two times two
appears to us always to make four ; yet it may be that to the people
of the planetary system of Sirius twice two appears as five.
Science cared little for sceptical objections ; it progressed, and the
progress of science has practically justified the boldness of the
scientist.
A philosopher who does recognize science may either blindly
accept or critically investigate the conditions of science, the prem-
ises from which science starts. He who blindly accepts them
takes them to be too grand and divine for investigation. Philos-
ophers of that kind are called by Kant "dogmatists." The dog-
matist rests satisfied with assertions. Kant followed neither the
sceptic nor the dogmatist, he proposed a middle way between both ;
he proposed the critical method, and herein we followed Kant.
The duty of philosophy is not to construct a system of asser-
tions, nor is its aim to undermine the possibility of knowledge
and end in eternal doubt. ,\s the duty of science is to systema-
tize methodically the facts in a certain sphere of experience ; so
the duty of philosophy is to explain this systemization, to show
its conditions, and to analyze the methods by which it is done.
The object of philosophy accordingly is mainly an investigation of
those "superscientific" premises upon which science is based.
The whole interest of philosophy is centred in what we have de-
fined as formal thought ; for the analysis of formal thought, as well
as an inquiry into its origin and its nature, teach us the ultimate
raison cf itre of the rigidity of law.
The rigidity of law
—
perhaps the most important superscien-
tific proposition—is indeed a K-fijia ig ah, i. e. "an intellectual pos-
session of humanity that has come to stay for good"—not according
to the private opinion of the author of Fiindanwntal Probh'iiis, but
according to the procedure of all scientists in all the many differ-
ent branches of knowledge. The author of Fiindatiieiito! Prob-
lems has attempted to investigate the tools with which science
works not so much for the purpose of assuring the scientist that
his tools are good—indeed, many scientists do not care about such
an assurance, for experience has taught them to rely upon their
methods, whatever be their philosophical import—but for the sole
purpose of supplying the want of explanation concerning a few
simple facts with which everybody is familiar, even he who cares
little for understanding them. There was, for instance, one very
simple question which troubled me even at an early age, the ques-
tion " Is twice two always four, and if so, why ?" That question
has found an answer satisfactory to my mind in Fiindniiu-n/nl
Pi-ohleiiis. If the statement of the solution appears to a certain
class of readers too positive, I can best excuse it by a quotation
from Goethe, wno says :
"If I am expected to listen to the opinion of some one else, it must be
positively pronounced. I have enough of the problematical myself."
Positiveness in statement is an economy in the exposition of
thought, and no fault should be found with emphasis laid upon
truths that remain wonderful and great even if they have become
most lucid to our comprehension.
My reviewer seems to be disappointed that the uTiijia ig hit is
" nothing but a regulative principle or plan for a system." Is
this indeed so little as to be called " nothing but "? Consider the
importance of a plan, of a regulative principle, of a method in-
forming us how to proceed. Let a man be lost in the wilderness ;
let him, then, find some means of orientation, of calculating the
place where he is, and the direction he has to pursue. Would
he consider that as " nothing but a plan "? This " nothing but 'a
plan for a system ' " is all-important to science, and can appear
only little to him who imagines that science is in possession of a
magic key to omniscience.*
PURE REASON AND EXPERIENCE.
Further on we read the following criticism :
"Like a staunch Lockian, Dr. Carus declares that ' the facts of nature are
specie, and our abstract thoughts are bills which serve to economize the pro-
cess of exchange of thoughts.' Yet these bills form so sound a currency that
'the highest laws of nature and the formal laws of thought are identical.'
Nay, 'the doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy, although discov-
ered with the assistance of experience, can be proved in its full scope by the
pure reason alone.' When abstracfreason performs such a feat as that, is it
only economizing the interchange of thought ? Jhere is no tincture of Locke
here."
Locke's theory is generally, and perhaps rightly, considered'
as sensationalism. He proceeds from the rule that nothing is in
the mind which was not before in the senses. {Nihil est in iiilel-
lectu nisi prills fuerit in sensii.) Sense-impressions are the
origin and beginning of all knowledge. Locke says :
" Whence hath the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To
this I answer in one word, from experience ; in that all our knowledge is
tb(N
* We omit to discuss here, for a second time, the problem of spon
eity of motion and the rigidity of mechanical laws. My critic says :
"When we afterwards read that, 'in our opinion, atoms possess spon
eity, or self-motion,' we wonder how, if this is anything more than ar
pty phrase, it comports with rigid regularity of motion."
The subject has been discussed in the article ' Feeling and Motion,
0. 153 and No. 154), and has been mentioned again in the discussion
Dr. Montgomery (No. 156, on page 2466, of TIte Open Court).
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founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed
either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our
minds, perceived and reflected by ourselves, is that which supplies our under-
standing with all the materials of thinking. These are the fountains of
knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do
spring—that is, sensation and reflection."
It appears that Kant in the most essential point agrees with
Locke. The very first sentence in his " Critique of Pure Reason "
declares :
" That all our knov/Iedge begins with experience there can be no doubt.
For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into
exercise otherwise than by means of objects which afifect our senses ?"
Locke wrote in a time when the philosophers of mankind were
still under the influence of Descartes's theory of innate ideas. So
he found it necessary to inculcate the truth, that all knowledge
springs from "experience—that is, sensation and reflection."
Kant made a distinction between experience and pure reason.
He confined experience to sensation and placed it in opposition to
that which Locke calls reflection. Kant says : " Although all
our knowledge begins with experience (i. e. sensation), it by no
means follows that all arises out of experience (i. e sensation)."
Kant then arrives at the conclusion that there is some knowledge
altogether independent of all sensory impressions. " Knowledge of
this kind," he says, " is called a priori, in ontradistinction to em-
pirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in
experience (sensation)."
Knowledge a priori is a learned expression for that which we
would prefer to call " formal thought." Knowledge a priori, said
Kant, is the condition of all experience, for there can be no sensa-
tion without the forms of understanding. In other words, sense-
impressions by themselves are meaningless ; they have to be inter-
preted in order to be conceived as sensations. A sensation is a
sense-impression felt to be and interpreted as the effect of some ex-
ternal object. But in order to achieve this mental act of chang-
ing a sense-impression into a sensation a sentient creature wants
something of that faculty—be it in ever so rudimentary a state
—
which is called understanding.
John Stuart Mill did not see the difficulty of the situation. He
based all experience upon the principle of causation, and when
he was required to give an account of the principle of causation,
he declared that it was derived from experience. This is called a
vicious circle.
Schopenhauer was aware of the fact that the principle of
causality is the condition of all e.xperience. " We do not see with
our eyes," he said, " but with our understanding." Judging from
certain effects, we conclude that there are causes which produce
them. Taking this ground, he believes in the priority of the prin-
ciple of causation in mind, and he considers it as a real innate
idea in the oldest and most antiquated sense of the term.
The term experience should be used in a wider sense, than is
done by Kant; it should be used in the sense of Locke. Experi-
ence includes both sense-impressions and reflections, sensations
and formal thought, knowledge a posteriori and knowledge a priori.
One single sense-impression cannot constitute knowledge ; it can
not (as Schopenhauer proposes) be conceived as the effect of a
cause. It remains a single and isolated sense-impression. But
two or several sense-impressions constitute a very weak begin-
ning of that faculty (or rather function) which in its further de-
velopment is called understanding. The forms of sense-impres-
sions and the relations among sense-impressions are also parts of
experience. The formal and the relational are the sources from
which springs pure reason. From these insignificant beginnings
all the formal sciences, can be and have been developed.
Animals that can frame word-symbols to represent certain
mental pictures, develop into rational beings ; and rational beings
that learn to abstract the formal element of thought and apply
the rules of formal thought to experience develop into scientists.
Formal thought not only aids us in the classification of the
data of experience ; it also assists in the amplification of knowledge.
It is this wonderful quality which makes formal thought so valu-
able. For the laws of formal thought possess universality and
rigidity (AUg^'iminlwi/ iinJ Xot/m'cnJif^kL'it), anl agiin, it is this
wonderful quality—apparently mysterious and yet founded in the
nature of form—to which formal thought owes that odd name
" a priori," because we know of all formal laws that they hold good
under any circumstances. We know that twice two are four and
will be four as long as cognition lasts and even longer, h. rever-
sion of the formal laws is inconceivable ; for, verily, till heaven and
earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the for-
mal laws. They are irrefragable, and all the changes that are
taking place around us are nothing but a constant fulfilment of
the formal laws.
Locke did not recognize the all-importance of the formal ele-
ment in experience—for pure reason is nothing but a system of
the formal element of experience. Nevertheless, the main principle
of his method, viz., that experience is the source of all knowledge,
has rather been confirmed than refuted in the further progress of
philosophy.
Pure Reason, or the mental function of formal thought does
not stand in opposition and still less in contradiction to experience.
It has grown from experience and is an integral part of experience
in the sense defined above. For we understand by pure reason
agreement with the formal laws of existence. The forms of things,
the relations among them are also data of experience ; they are not
shaped by us with arbitrary liberty, they are given to us by ex-
perience. We own them in our minds as the forms of our thoughts ;
we have abstracted the laws of formal thought by reflection and
introspection. The formal element was imported into our minds
together with the sense-impressions. We do not deny that mere
isolated sense-impressions can not generate knowledge ; and we
must not look for the source of pure reason in the sense element
of the sense-impressions, but in the formal and relational element,
which is imparted to sentient beings through a constant repetition
of sense-impressions of various forms. The formal accordingly is
ultimately derived not from sensory sources, but nevertheless
from experience. It has been gained by abstraction ; i. e., we
have arrived at it by omitting in our experience the sensory element
and by retaining the formal alone. p. c.
CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE DISCUSSION "IS
MONISM UNTENABLE."
BY DR. MONTGOMERY.
I THINK the importance of the subject involved in our philoso-
phic passage of arms justifies another round, which I hope you will
not decline.
Of course, I did not expect we would come to an understand-
ing regarding fundamental problems. Indeed, I was certain that
mv old-fashioned view of what Monism should be, could nowise
find favor with your more modern ideas. But I failed to foresee
that you would be able so completely to expose the absurdity of al-
most every sentence in which I endeavored to convey my thought,
or rather the confusion of thought of which you have superabund-
antly convicted me. No wonder, that, after so universal a deluge
of reproof (Siindfluth), I find myself stranded, as you say. "in a
vast labyrinth in which I have lost my way " ; and, worst of all,
without any species of thought saved for future generation.
Often before misgivings overcame me. that, in the philo-
sophical isolation in which I am passing my days, I was losing the
guiding thread that leads out of the maze of contradictory opinions
to progressive and consistent views. But from time to time kind
friends were good enough to reassure me to some extent. Not long
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ago the Editor of Mind took occasion in the course of a discussion
on "the psychological theory of extension" to remark : Dr. M's
abode " is not too remote for him to watch everything that goes on
across half a continent and a whole ocean." "Everything" may
have here meant only the general current of what is going on in
England, though I was flattering myself, that I was watching with
equal concern the main drift of German, French and Italian
thought.
This—I am now forced to admit—turns out to have been a
fond illusion. I must evidently be color-blind to what you would
call "the modern and most progressed phase of science." Or
this phase of science must be wholly " beyond the depth " my mind
is capable of fathoming. Appealing then to you as teacher of such
advanced science, you will perhaps not grudge the pains of once
more explaining in plain terms the nature of that "modern psy-
chology," with which—as you tell us in No. 24 of The Open Court
—you "became acquainted during your stay at La Salle" ; the
psychology which has led you from ' ' Metaphysicism to Positiv-
ism," and which you now frequently invoke in support of your
monistic conception of the world.
Though you name Ribot and Hering as having initiated you
into this modern phase of science, I cannot see that their method
of research differs in any way from the one we have all along been
conversant with as that followed by what is generally called ' ' physi-
ological psychology " ; a method whose essential characteristic is to
be frankly dualistic, to use openly ' ' both inward and outward ex-
perience, " as Ribot himself puts it in chapter I. of his ' ' Diseases of
the Will." And the dualistic character of his method is just as
clearly recognized by Hering. In his celebrated essay on organic
memory, which inspired Haeckel's theory of the " Perigenesis of
the Plastidule, " he plainly calls the observed concomitancy, ob-
taining between molecular brain-motion and states of conscious-
ness, the "dual aspect of organic life."
We observe outwardly a material process, inwardly a corre-
sponding conscious state, both originating, varying and waning
concomitantly. We conclude that these two sets of wholly dis-
parate events must somehow hang together. But how ? This is
the essential question whose solution would determine either the
fundamental oneness or the fundamental duality of body and mind
;
would land us for good either in Monism or in Dualism.
As to whether or not the ' ' two variables, matter and conscious-
ness, are connected with each other as cause and effect," " we do
not know anything about it." This declaration comes dangerously
near being a profession of dualistic Agnosticism. Yet it is, what
Hering, one of your principal teachers, says about the connection
of the two disparate modes of existence.
But strangest of all, not only your teachers, but you yourself
explicitly adopt the dualistic standpoint necessarily involved in the
incommensurability of the inward and the outward experience, of
the material process and the corresponding mental state, of the
consciousness of things and the things themselves. In your article
on "The Unknowable" The Open Com-t No. 23 you say : "Cogni-
tion means nothing more or less than the correct representation of
things in psychic images and ideas ; and things are know-able be-
cause they can be mirrored in the brain of reasonable beings."
In what does this statement differ, otherwise than verbally, from
what I have always sought to prove, and what I have dogmatically
expressed in T/ie Open Court No. 20 ; namely, ' ' that our percepts
faithfully represent the sundry characteristics of the outside exis-
tents which are affecting our senses ; and that, so far as this is the
case, the outside existents are thoroughly well known to us, belong-
ing in fact to one and the same order of being or cosmos as our-
selves ;—a cosmos all parts of which are interdependently connected
by natural links " ?
This point-blank declaration concerning the representative
character of "psychic images" is however—as I am fully aware
—
only a dogmatic assertion of what I believe to be the true state of
things. Consequently, you cannot expect me to ascribe a higher
value to your equivalent assertion. But the assertion itself, far
from being monistic, is on the contrary plainly dualistic. It ac-
knowledges the existence of psychic images in our brain, and the
existence of things outside our brain represented by these psychic
images. The genuine monistic problem has hitherto consisted,
and does in my opinion still consist, in the task of actually proving,
that, though the psychic images of things seem to differ toto getiere
in substantial consistency from the things represented, yet both
orders—that of ideas and that of things—have nevertheless their
origin and being in one common nature.
You seem to think, that in order to establish Monism it is
sufficient to declare, that cognition faithfully represents a cosmos
of which it is itself forming part. I would like to know which kind
of " modern psychology" bears you out in this summary method of
procedure. I know of none, not even that of Dr. Abbot, which
rests on the arbitrary assertion, that our percepts are in all reality
identical, geometrically congruous, with the outside things per-
ceived. He spurns the notion of the psychic images merely " re-
presenting" the outside things.
The brilliant, all too soon departed, scientist and philosopher,
whom in the enthusiasm of recent discovery you call "one of our
most profound thinkers," attempted—as you are no doubt aware
—
in an article published in Mind, 1878, the solution of the genuine
monistic problem on the old-established, and in your opinion anti-
quated lines. He endeavored to prove, that those horridly agnos-
tic bugbears, the things-in-themselves, the very things 'ohieh you
voiirse/f ngnostically confess of knoiving only as represented in phychic
images, that these things known only in their psychic representa-
tions are made of the same stuff as the images by which they are
represented. For instance, that the candlestick out yonder con-
sists of the same mind-stuff as its image in my brain. In a discus-
sion on the subject, published in The Index, December, 1885, I
tried to detect the flaw in Clifford's argument, and to show that the
candlestick cannot possibly consist of mind-stuff.
Edmund Gurney in an article on "Monism," (Mind, No. 22)
attacked, in connection with Clifford's mind-stuff theory and Spi-
noza's absolute substance, the same problem of mind and matter,
but likewise from the antiquated point of view. He says : "Your
brain with its movements corresponding to, yet wholly unlike your
feelings, is the sort of matter in respect of which that dualism (of
mind and matter) first presents itself in our day as an urgent phi-
losophical problem. The attempt at transcending the dualism
have of course made up a great part of the history of philosophy. "
Will you then kindly in the light of your more modern and
progressed science inform us of what stuff the candlestick is really
made ? Does it consist of mind-stuff ? matter-stuff ? or any other
stuff ? or of no stuff at all ?
And will you tell us also whether the psychic images and the
things represented by them are identical or not identical in consti-
tution ? And, if identical, in what way ? in ideal constitution ? in
material constitution ? or in what other mode of constitution ?
These are questions that a thinker in possession of a monistic
philosophy can have no hesitation whatever in definitely answer-
ing.
Y'our kind gift of Fundamental Problems and The Ethical Prob-
lem, which I hereby gratefully acknowledge, shows that you do
not regard as altogether hopeless the stagnation "in the phase of
thought in which I have become stationary" ; that, though my
thought belongs to "a past period in the history of philosophy," I
may possibly by means of your friendly assistance gain a glimpse
of the serene realm of settled questions, in which all difficulties are
overcome "with which human thought was then struggling."
Edmund Montgomery.
1
THE OPEN COURT. 2513
REPLY BY THE EDITOR.
I AM glad to hear and to have it testified to by competent au-
thority that Dr. Montgomery keeps himself lUi cmii-nnt with English,
German, French and Italian literature. I do not think that the
Doctor suffers under a fond illusion when he believes himself upon
the whole extraordinarily well informed as to the progress of sci-
ence. Very likely he is much better informed upon many subjects
than I am. I only meant to say that a progress had been made in
certain quarters of scientific research which has escaped his atten-
tion, and unfortunately those topics formed the subject of our dis-
cussion. However, I have nt-nr ihui/ihJ that a man of so unusual
ability, extensive knowledge, and broad interests as Dr. Montgom-
ery, keeps himself, at least in his specialties, an cotirnnt with the
literature of the day and grows with his time.
Dr. Montgomery I hope does not expect me to say anything
concerning the philosophical position of Professor Hering, Pro-
fessor Haeckel, and M. Ribot. I see no use in prolonging our dis-
cussion by investigating whether these savants are monists, or du-
alists, or agnostics.
I am much obliged to Dr. Montgomery for having called my
attention to his article "The Dual Aspect of our Nature." I read
the article with great pleasure and was exceedingly interested in
his skilful attack upon Professor Clifford's position "that the can-
dlestick out yonder consists of the same mind-stuff as its image in
my brain."
Dr. Montgomery having stated his opinion in the article alluded
to, asks me for my opinion. My opinion is stated at some length
in the article "Feeling and Motion" in Nos. 153 and 154 of The
Optii Court. There Professor Clifford's position "On the Nature of
Things in Themselves"* is briefly recapitulated and commented
upon.
Professor Clifford calls the elements of which the thinking
subject consists, "mind-stuff"; and he arrives at his conclusion
(viz., that the candlestick, a picture of which appears in my brain,
must ultimately consist of the same stuff as the brain image) in a
mathematical way by employing the rule of three. This is the
same truth which was expressed in Fundamental Problems by the
phrase " Nature is alive," which means that inorganic nature can-
not be absolutely dead matter ; it contains the conditions of devel-
oping the psychic life that in a further evolution appears in animal
organisms.
Speaking of the basis from which Professor Clifford starts.
Dr. Montgomery declares that ' ' the untruth of this bold assertion
is so patent, that we might safely reject without further examina-
tion any doctrine based upon it " ; and he adds concerning Pro-
fessor Clifford's conclusion which is quoted in full pp. 2435 and
2436 of The Open Court: "The hollow mathematical sophistry of
this ' rule of three ' argument is easily exposed."
Dr. Montgomery, it seems to me, has in one point miscon-
ceived Professor Clifford's view. Dr. Montgomery says : ' ' Men-
tality is the product of organized vital activity," and he objects to
'
' the strenuous but vain endeavor to discover mind also in in-
organic nature.''' It must be remembered, that Clifford's term
" mind-stuff " does not designate "mind" in the sense of "men-
tality." It does not mean the organized mind of man, but the
elements from which feeling and consciousness have originated.
Professor Clifford does not find ' ' mentality " in unorganized nature;
on the contrary, he maintains that the rational develops from the
irrational. His mind-stuff, as far as its elements are concerned, is
in its original condition not endowed with mentality.
Professor Clifford does
etaphysical sense, as the N
iesthe term in a peculiar way,
oy kind of mysticism, dualism
e the expression " Thing in itself " in the
1, the Absolute, or the Unconditioned. He
nd his statement cannot be taken as favoring
r hyperphysicism.
It may be that, in the main point. Dr. Montgomery more
agrees with Professor Clifford, and perhaps also with me, than
might appear from the controversial attitude in which our opinions
have been exhibited.
The three articles, viz., Professor Clifford's "On Things in
Themselves," {Mind, No. IX.,) Dr. Montgomery's "The Dual Aspect
of our Nature, " ( Tlie Index, Dec. 24, 1885, ) and my own, ' ' Motion
and Feeling, [The Open Court, Nos. 153 and 154,) are easily ac-
cessible to our readers, and we conclude the controversy on the
subject by recommending a comparison of the different conceptions.
CORRESPONDENCE.
"THE AFRICAN IN AMERICA": ITS COMPLEXITIES
AND PERPLEXITIES.
To the Editor of The Open Court —
I agree with Prof. E. D. Cope that the pure African has a pe-
culiar, and in some respects a sui generis, organism. The African
in the United States now, is much superior in the aggregate to his
ancestors, who came over from Africa in slave ships from 1620 on
till the end of " A Christian broker in the trade of blood." He is
a citizen and voter in the Union and " entitled to all its rights and
immunities." His life, his labor, his hopes, and aspirations : all his
interests are diffused among and interwoven with our customs, laws
and institutions. His religious, educational, and property inter-
ests are all planted here. Among the colored people there is eveiy
degree, proportion, and mixture of white and black blood. How
many of them are pure Africans ?
There are at least 100,000 of these so called Africans, who are
educated and have from $1,000 to Si, 000, 000 in property. Would
they go to any part of Africa just to please Prof. Cope or me ? I
wish equally with him they were elsewhere,—but they are here.
Can we consistently with justice and constitutional rights force
them to leave us ?
Prof. Cope deplores the action of ignorant voters. So do I.
Still more do I deplore and denounce the intriguing dishonesty,
the heartless, unscrupulous scheming of the educated (?) few who
pervert their intellect, to mislead, deceive, and plunder the stupid
and ignorant wealth-producers, whether priest, politician, or plu-
tocrat, whether by church or state, through its educated leaders.
"O it is e.Tccellent to have a. giant's strength, (education—brain-
power,) but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant." It is this class
of men—men who say " The people be d d," and act it—who
are menacing this Republic and who are more dangerous than the
African. Let them be sent somewhere, or use their mental power
for just and human purposes. You do not want to be " governed
by the non-voting population." I do not want to be governed by
any power any further than by " the consent of the governed," and
to protect and defend me in the " pursuit of happiness." Our so-
called government has deteriorated and degraded into a monopo-
lizing, privileged aristocracy and plutocracy.
If you eliminate the African for his tendency to destroy our
Republic, there will still be many Jonahs, equally dangerous, to be
cast overboard from the Ship of State, now struggling with tre-
mendous winds and waves.
The subject of Heredity has been the burden of my mind,
the subject of my tongue and pen for fifty years, and I am glad
Prof. Cope appreciates it. Most of our leaders in education, or
Church, or State are lamentably ignorant of, or ignore, the subject
of human parentage. No society, government, or association can
be higher, better, healthier, or happier, than the average men-
tal and moral development of its members. The significance
and paramount importance of this truth is contained in Christ's
words: "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fiuit, nor
a good tree produce evil fruit." If we would rid the world
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o£ imbeciles, criminals, and invalids, we must stop producing
them. To me it is the climax of all human sins to bring into
being those who can neither be educated, lienlthy, nor happy.
Heredity should be an important topic in every curriculum. It
should be a national affair. " What shall we do to be saved ?" I
heard regeneration for seventy years. It is lime, in the order of
human progress, to omit the re and talk and write 3.ho\x\. generation
of human beings that are luorlh saving.
Columbus, Kan. J. H. Cook.
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE AMERI-
CAN SECULAR UNION.
We have received from the American Secular Union a notice,
which reads as follows :
—
The Fourteenth Annual Congress of the American Secular
Union has been appointed by the Board of Directors to meet at
Portsmouth, Ohio, on Friday evening, October 31, 1890, and to
continue its sessions on the Saturday and Sunday following.
The meetings will be held in the Grand Opera House, corner
of Sixth and Court streets, and the orchestra of the establish-
ment has been engaged for the occasion. Due notice will be
given of the proposed reduction in railroad, steamboat, and hotel
fares.
Portsmouth is situated on the Ohio River, one hundred miles
east of Cincinnati, and one hundred miles south of Columbus,
and has extensive and convenient railway connections with the
whole country. It is a port of foreign entry, and is distinguished
for its numerous and magnificent manufactories. It has a popu-
lation exceeding fifteen thousand (15,000), has twenty churches,
the Ohio Military Academy, and a splendid system of graded
schools. The Ohio Valley Fair is held there annually, and several
English and German papers, daily and weekly, are published in
the city.
The members and friends of the American Secular Union are
sure of a hearty welcome, not only from our enterprising local
auxiliary, but also from the citizens at large.
The object of the American Secular Union, as is well known,
is to secure the total separation of CJiurcIi and State in fact and in
form, to the end that equal rights in religion, genuine morality in
politics, and freedom, virtue, and brotherhood be established, pro-
tected, and perpetuated. While we unite on what is commonly
known as the ''Nine Demands of Secularism,' we propose to em-
phasize the following at the coming Congress :
1. The equitable taxation of church property in common
with other property.
2. The total discontinuance of religious instruction and wor-
ship in the public schools, and especially the reading of any Bible.
3. The repeal and prevention of all laws enforcing the ob-
servance of Sunday as a religious institution, rather than an eco-
nomic one, justified by physiological and other secular reasons.
4. The cessation of all appropriations of the public funds for
educational and charitable institutions of a sectarian character.
The American Secular Union is strictly unsectarian and non-
partisan in both religion and politics, but will use any and all hon-
orable means to secure its objects as above stated. It is not either
publicly or privately committed to the advancement of any system
of religious belief or disbelief, but heartily welcomes all persons,
of whatever faith, to its membership, on the basis of "no union
of Church and State." The word ' secular ' is here used in the
broadest sense, as applied to the State, and not to any system of
religion or philosophy.
To discuss these questions in an orderly and friendly manner,
and to devise ways and means to promote these objects, let us come
together at this Congress, as Free-thinkers, Spiritualists, Unitari-
ans, Universalists, Free Religionists, Quakers, Progressive Jews
and Liberal Christians, and, laying aside our peculiar views on re-
ligious questions, unite as American citizens on the one broad plat-
form of no union of Church and State, and the complete admin-
istration of our secular government on purely secular principles.
The National Reform Association, having for its object the
establishment of Christianity as the religion of the State by con-
stitutional enactment ; the American Sabbath Union, working for
the enforcement, by legislation, of the Jewish and Puritanic Sab-
bath on our free citizens ; the Women's Christian Temperance
Union, endorsing the platforms and policy of both these organi-
zations
; the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, insisting
through their ecclesiastical bodies upon the complete exemption of
church property from just taxation, as well as the appropriation
of public money for religious schools and other sectarian institu-
tions ; all these, and many others which might be mentioned, are
imperiling our constitutional liberties. Every true Liberal and
Patriot, whether man or woman, should feel called upon to aid in
organizing an effective opposition to these nefarious schemes.
Due notice will be given of the selection of eminent speakers
from all portions of the United States and Canada, and a free plat-
form will be given to all persons who may have a word to say for
pure state secularization. All, without exception, are welcome
to this Congress in the wide-awake little city in the valley of the
beautiful Ohio.
BOOK NOTICES.
An Indignity to our Citizen Soldiers, a sermon preached in the
First Parish Church, Cambridge, June i, i8go, by Edward H.
Hall. The subject of this sermon is the pension legislation of the
last ten years, as to which Mr. Hall declares that it " is the most
disreputable business in which an honorable nation could engage
;
that it carries in itself all the elements of corruption, hypocrisy,
and demoralization
; that it is not called for by patriotism, by
charity, or by statesmanship, that it is a burlesque upon states-
manship ; that it is a libel upon charity ; and that it strikes the
most cruel blow at patriotism which that noble sentiment ever re-
ceived." An appendix is added giving statistics of pension legisla-
tion and expenditures, from which it appears that the total amount
paid in the Civil War pensions to the end of the fiscal year June
30, 1890, was $1,009,466,980.
The Rev. H. Higgins, M. A., Chairman of Sub-Committee,
Liverpool Free Public Museum, has sent us a copy of his address
to the Museum's Association, at their meeting, held in June last at
Liverpool, (England.) The address, after giving a sketch of the
life and work of the " Father of Museums," Conrad Gesner refers
to the appliances at the Museum of Liverpool, and the principles
according to which its specimens have been arranged. Mr. Hig-
gins dwells on the ne',o knowledge of which evolution is the
" crowning characteristic, " saying finally " the conclusion cannot
be far away ; that the highest aim of work in public museums is
not—however ingeniously—to multiply facts in the memories of
visitors, but to kindle in their hearts the wonder and the loving
sympathy
—
the new knowledge—called for by every page in the
remotely-reaching annals of nature." We are glad to see that Mr.
Higgins gives in this relation a quotation from The Open Court.
We have received Circular Letter No. i, issued by the Com-
mission, appointed by the State of Pennsylvania, to consider the
question of coal waste in that state. The Commission being de-
sirous of making the investigation as comprehensive and as ex-
haustive as possible, wish to obtain the results of all the best prac-
tical experience upon the subject, so as to diminish waste in future
as far as practicable, and to encourage the utilization of what are
now waste products. The Commission invites a full expression
of views upon the subject. Information as to the paiticular ques
tions to be considered can be obtained on application to the Chair-
man of the Commission, Mr. J. A. Price, Scranton, Pa.
